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It is a truism that conceptual understanding of a hypothesis is required for its empirical
investigation. However, the concept of recursion as articulated in the context of linguistic
analysis has been perennially confused. Nowhere has this been more evident than
in attempts to critique and extend Hauser et al’s. (2002) articulation. These authors
put forward the hypothesis that what is uniquely human and unique to the faculty of
language—the faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN)—is a recursive system
that generates and maps syntactic objects to conceptual-intentional and sensory-motor
systems. This thesis was based on the standard mathematical definition of recursion as
understood by Gödel and Turing, and yet has commonly been interpreted in other ways,
most notably and incorrectly as a thesis about the capacity for syntactic embedding. As we
explain, the recursiveness of a function is defined independent of such output, whether
infinite or finite, embedded or unembedded—existent or non-existent. And to the extent
that embedding is a sufficient, though not necessary, diagnostic of recursion, it has not
been established that the apparent restriction on embedding in some languages is of any
theoretical import. Misunderstanding of these facts has generated research that is often
irrelevant to the FLN thesis as well as to other theories of language competence that focus
on its generative power of expression. This essay is an attempt to bring conceptual clarity
to such discussions as well as to future empirical investigations by explaining three criterial
properties of recursion: computability (i.e., rules in intension rather than lists in extension);
definition by induction (i.e., rules strongly generative of structure); and mathematical
induction (i.e., rules for the principled—and potentially unbounded—expansion of strongly
generated structure). By these necessary and sufficient criteria, the grammars of all natural
languages are recursive.
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THREE PROPERTIES OF RECURSION
The theory of recursive functions was propounded in the foun-
dations of mathematics. One of the profoundest of foundational
problems—Hilbert’s decision problem (Entscheidungsproblem)—
was to formulate a procedure (Entscheidungsverfahren) that, in a
finite number of steps, would decide the validity of a given logi-
cal expression. More generally, from a logical formalism of finitely
specifiable axioms and theories, such a procedure would decide—
i.e., compute, hence explain—potentially infinite non-arbitrary
sets of theorems and data in systems of the formal and natural sci-
ences. “Once [this] logical formalism is established one can expect
that a systematic, so-to-say computational treatment of logical
formulas is possible” (Hilbert and Ackermann, 1928: 72). It only
remained to formalize the intuitive concept of computability.
COMPUTABILITY
Turing (1936) demonstrated that computational treatments could
be established for particular decision problems, but that no gen-
eral decision procedure exists. Thus concluded the Hilbertian
program. However, of greater significance than this negative
result was that, in its application to the decision problem,
Turing’s mathematics had formalized the intuitive concept of a
computation—equivalently, a generative procedure—in the form
of his automatic machine (now called a Turing machine): a mathe-
matical object—an abstract computer—represented functionally
by a control unit (a finite program of rules, states, and sym-
bols), a tape (an unbounded memory), and a read/write head (a
mechanism for decoding, encoding, and manipulating symbols
on the tape). In a stepwise process analogous to proof construc-
tion, the machine deterministically generates outputs (analogous
to theorems) given inputs (which, with initial conditions, form a
set analogous to axioms) by returning—recursing—intermediate
results (analogous to lines or lemmas) according to its pro-
grammed rules.
It is of fundamental importance to understand that the
non-arbitrary set generated by a recursive function qua Turing
machine need not be represented as an output; to recursively gen-
erate a set is not to produce it. The function is defined in intension:
it specifies the conditions some object would need to satisfy to
be subsumed in the set, and it is possible that no such objects
are presented. This notion of intension is realized in a Turing
machine as rules for conditional branching: e.g., “IF in state qi,
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reading symbol xi on the tape, THEN write yi, move one space,
transition to state qj.” The machine produces a set of outputs if
and only if it enters the defined configurations, but that set—the
set of possible outputs—is determined (generated) by the rules
“in advance” of—indeed independent of—any input. For exam-
ple, independent of its potential application to particular inputs,
a rule of arithmetic determines (generates) a range of numbers
(i.e., the non-arbitrary set of possible outputs) given a domain of
inputs.
It is because of the aforementioned insights from Turing that
we define language as I-language: a function in intension, internal
to the mind/brain of an individual of the species Homo sapi-
ens sapiens. I-language is to be distinguished from E-language:
one way to think of E-language, departing from the terminol-
ogy of Chomsky (1986), is as the function defined in exten-
sion. The extension of I-language can be defined as the set
of objects it generates and thereby constrains (i.e., the set of
outputs it could in principle produce, including any it actu-
ally does). We can further illustrate the I- v. E- distinction in
the case of language by drawing an analogy to arithmetic. We
can define I-arithmetic—represented internal to the mind/brain
of an individual of the species Homo sapiens sapiens—as the
function in intension that generates as its extension a set of
arithmetical theorems (E-arithmetic). The latter may not be rep-
resented anywhere (internally or externally); it is non-etheless the
set generated by the former in the sense that the extension is
deterministically specified by the intension. If I-arithmetic were
encoded as a computer program (a finite amount of information),
the standard ontological assumption in computer science and
information theory would be that E-arithmetic—which would
require an infinite number of bits to fully enumerate—is com-
pressed into the program. If I-arithmetic were to output a set,
the members would be those and only those that satisfy the
specified conditions (i.e., the intension) of the generative func-
tion; in this way E-arithmetic is constrained. Identical logic
defines I-language into which E-language is compressed: the
generative function—a finite conditional branching program—
determines a (potentially infinite) set of structured expressions
that could but need not be enumerated 1. Thus, the I-language/
E-language distinction is fundamental to understanding the
nature of FLN (as a function in intension) and its uniqueness
(i.e., as far as we know, no such distinction applies to the claimed
analogues/homologues of language in non-human animals).
The range of a recursive function can be infinite, as with the
arithmetical rule. The computation can run to infinity, but its
rules are finitely specified and at any step in the computation only
a finite amount of tape has been processed. The finiteness of the
machine is fundamental: the set of theorems or data derivable
or predictable in a consistent system or theory is non-arbitrary
such that an extensional definition (a list of the theorems/data)
cannot suffice; a list does not derive and thereby delimit (and
thereby explain) the set. Therefore, it is necessary to define the
set intensionally by a finite procedure (a rule) to derive or predict
1Given that recursive procedures define linguistic and mathematical cogni-
tion, investigations into the degree of neural overlap of these domains could
bear upon the FLN hypothesis.
what things satisfy the conditions to be subsumed in the set or
equivalently to generate (describe) all and only those things the
set subsumes. In other words, if a set is non-arbitrary, then there
must exist a reason why it subsumes all and only those things it
does; and the rule is the reason.
Computable functions are therefore those “calculable by finite
means” (Turing, 1936: 230), specifically by a Turing machine.
With this elegantly elementary model of computation, the gen-
eral concept of a formal system was established. Such systems are
generative, and thus explicative of sets of theorems/data. These
systems therefore constitute the ontological and epistemological
foundations of the formal and natural sciences.
INDUCTION
Turing proceeded to prove the mathematical equivalence
of computability to the effective-calculability (λ-definability)
which Church (1936) had demonstrated to be mathematically
equivalent to the recursiveness of Gödel (1934/1986). Gödel had
embroidered the primitive notion of recursion whereby “[a]
number theoretic function φ is said to be recursive if there is
a finite sequence of number-theoretic functions φ1, φ2, . . . ,φn
that ends with φ and has the property that every function φn
of the sequence is recursively defined in terms of [. . . ] preced-
ing functions, or [. . . ] is the successor function x + 1” (Gödel,
1931/1986: 159). We next explain the significance of this rather
dense definition for our discussion.
Gödel’s first property of a recursive function—its specification
in a finite sequence—is that of Turing computability. The second
and third properties—the function is defined in terms of preced-
ing functions or reduces to the successor function—are those of
induction, in its two senses: definition by induction andmathemat-
ical induction; the distinction between these related concepts can
be seen in the specific recursive system of generative grammar.
The original formulation of a generative grammar was not
as a Turing machine but as the formally equivalent rewrite rules
of Post (1947). Rewrite rules of the form φ → ψ (“rewrite φ as
ψ”) determine successive tape-machine configurations to derive
syntactic structures and thus, as with Turing machines, function
analogously to the rules of a proof. The derivation of a syntac-
tic structure can be defined as the “running through” (Chomsky,
1955: 67) of rewrite rules [n.b., recursion is from the Latin recursio
(“running back”)]: “A derivation is thus roughly analogous to a
proof with ,” a finite set of initial symbols, “taken as the axiom
system and F,” the finite set of rewrite rules, “[taken] as the rules
of inference” (Chomsky, 1956: 117).
The Post formalism represents explicitly the recursiveness of a
generative grammar, with outputs recursed (returned) as inputs
in the form of recursion applied by Gödel and represented in
the stepwise computation of a Turing machine: i.e., definition
by induction (definition by recursion) whereby a function f is
defined for an argument x by a previously defined value (e.g., f (y),
y < x) so as to strongly generate increasingly complex structures
carried forward on the tape. The strong generation of struc-
tures studied in formal linguistics is contradistinguished from
the weak generation of strings studied in formal language the-
ory; and only strong generation is of relevance to research on
natural language [see Chomsky (2007) on the inapplicability of
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formal language theory to natural language]. In other words,
a grammar strongly generates hierarchically structured expres-
sions and weakly generates the corresponding strings. It is a
structure, not a string, that represents grammatical information.
This information can, in turn, be mapped via formal semantics
and morphology-phonology to the conceptual-intentional and
sensory-motor systems. This mapping is supported by the fact
that one string can correspond tomany structures (in a many-one
function). Consider the string the boy saw the man with binoc-
ulars. This string is two-ways ambiguous because it corresponds
to two possible structures representing two possible interpreta-
tions: (i) {{the, boy}, {saw, {the, {man, {with, binoculars}}}}};
(ii) {{the, boy}, {{saw, {the, man}}, {with, binoculars}}}, Thus,
work on artificial language learning that is based on formal lan-
guage theory, with its restriction to weak generation (strings),
makes it largely irrelevant to the strong generation (structures)
of all natural languages. In this sense, and contrary to Fitch and
Friederici (2012), we do not see too many applications of formal
language theory to have been all that profitable in clarifying con-
cepts, formulating and testing hypotheses, or opening new fron-
tiers of research. However, there are important exceptions (e.g.,
Berwick, 1984; Stabler, 2010).
Definition by induction is related to the form of recursion
as mathematical induction from bounded to unbounded: “by a
grammar we mean a set of rules that (in particular) recursively
specify the sentences of a language. In general, each of the rules we
need will be of the form φ1, . . . ,φn → φn+ 1, [. . . ] where each of
the φi is a structure [. . . ] and the relation → is to be interpreted
as expressing the fact that if our process of recursive specifica-
tion generates the structures φ1, . . . , φn then it also generates the
structure φn+ 1” (Chomsky andMiller, 1963: 284). This formula-
tion is analogous to the successor function that, like other similar
functions, has the potential to generate an unbounded output.
Syntactic structures can be infinitely expanded by, among many
other means, conjunctions of phrases/clauses, adjectival modi-
fiers, prepositional modifiers, the mergers of relative and com-
plement clauses, and combinations of these rules [see Jackendoff
(2003) for examples]. We turn next to a discussion of bounded
and unbounded outputs, and their relationship to the underlying
generative function.
(UN)BOUNDEDNESS
The mathematical induction from bounded to unbounded is per-
haps the most misunderstood aspect of a recursive procedure.
Three facts are critical to proper understanding.
First, a recursive function may generate an infinite set yet
only produce a finite output because of arbitrary constraints. For
instance, Turing formulated a machine (a recursive function) for
the effective calculability of π. The decimal expansion of π is infi-
nite (i.e., 3.14. . .) such that the machine requires infinite steps
and infinite memory to generate its value as would a machine
for generating an infinite set of syntactic structures. Nevertheless,
the Turing machine generates or determines that the third digit
in the decimal expansion of π is 1 even if its tape can only
represent the first two digits; technically, even if the machine
is tapeless, it generates the third (and fourth and fifth. . . ) digit
(n.b., encoded with conditional branching, the machine would
write the digits if provided with sufficient tape). Analogously,
the grammar of a language L generates L in its infinity—i.e., I-
language generates E-language—regardless of the fact that only a
finite subset of its structures can ever be physically produced. For
instance, there exist infinitely many grammatical expansions of a
1300-word monster sentence from Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!,
thoughmost will never be produced [see Pinker (1999)]. It is thus
a fundamental fallacy to conclude that “the use of infinity as a
tool for proofs in mathematics [. . . ] leaves such proofs techni-
cally irrelevant in the real world of finite brains and finite time”
(Fitch and Friederici, 2012: 1933): finite brains running in finite
time literally do generate infinite sets. Equally arbitrary to physical
limitations are formal stipulations: e.g., capping the calculation
and/or representation of a decimal expansion to two digits; e.g.,
capping syntactic embedding to some finite depth.
Second, because the range of a recursive function is by
definition non-arbitrary, any arbitrarily limited output can be
expanded in a principled manner. So “even though we have a
finite brain, that brain is really more like the control unit for
[. . . ] a Turing machine in the sense that although we have a
finite control unit for a brain, nevertheless we can use indefi-
nite amounts of memory that are given to us externally,” e.g., as
a tape, “to perform more and more complex computations[. . . ].
We do not have to learn anything new to extend our capacities
in this way” (Chomsky, 2004: 41–42). We do not have to learn
anything new because our computations are “completely deter-
mined” by programs enabling conditional branching, i.e., “a note
of instructions [. . . ] explaining how the work is to be continued”
given any possible input, which may never be given; hence con-
ditional branching. “This note is the counterpart of the ‘state of
mind’ [and] determines the possible behavior of the machine”
(Turing, 1936: 253, 231). Such programs are explicitly rejected in
connectionism (e.g., Elman, 1991; Siegelmann, 2013) and appar-
ently absent in non-human animal cognition (e.g., Rey et al.,
2012;Watumull et al., 2013).Whether these uniquely human pro-
grams emerged specific to language and were thereafter exapted to
other domains (e.g., mathematics, music, morality, etc.) or were
from the beginning domain general (e.g., Corballis, 2011) is an
interesting question [see DeWitt (2013)], but one that is outside
of the present paper’s aims. Whatever their origin, these recursive
programs provided our capacity for thought and expression with
a uniquely powerful upgrade.
Third, the representation (extension) of the set generated is
immaterial to the form (intension) of its generation. For instance,
given that recursiveness is a property of the procedure applicable
to any input rather than a property of potential output, equating
recursion with syntactic embedding is simply a fallacy.
RECAPITULATION
The core computational mechanisms of recursion, proposed to
be constitutive of FLN, are: (i) computability, (ii) definition by
induction, and (iii) mathematical induction. A computable func-
tion is necessary to derive sets; a list is epistemologically and,
more importantly, ontologically meaningless. That the function
is defined inductively enables it to strongly generate increasingly
structured expressions. And with mathematical induction, the
computable generation of such expressions is unbounded.
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RECURSION IN HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
Given the explication of recursion in the previous section, we turn
next to two lines of research that have been headlined as knock-
outs of the FLN thesis, as well as earlier formulations of Universal
Grammar (UG) (the theory of the genetic endowment for lan-
guage). In particular, we discuss why claims of languages lacking
recursive expressions, though of interest, say nothing about recur-
sive functions because output systems are simply not relevant to
the instantiation of this capacity in all human brains. Conversely,
we discuss why claims that animals are capable of processing
embedded expressions, though interesting, do not take down the
uniqueness claim that underpins the FLN thesis. Embedding,
though of interest as a computational capacity, is not synonymous
with recursion, and nor is embedding part of the original FLN
thesis.
CAPS AND GAPS
Consider a recent critique of FLN-style theories: “there is lit-
tle evidence that unlimited recursion, understood as center-
embedding, is typical of natural language syntax. [T]his fits
ill with the claim (Hauser et al., 2002) [. . . ] that ‘recursion’
(understood as embedding) may be the one crucial domain-
specific feature of linguistic ability” (Levinson, 2013: 149, 152).
This quote embodies the conceptual confusions discussed in the
earlier sections above.
First, as discussed in section Three Properties of Recursion, to
understand recursion as embedding is actually to misunderstand
recursion: to equate recursion—a property of the generative pro-
cedure (applicable to any input)—with possible properties (e.g.,
embedded structure) of its (potential) output is simply a math-
ematical error. But even accepting properties of the output as
indicative of a recursivemechanism, embedding is not dispositive,
as linguistic typologists have long known: e.g., “In a large number
of Australian languages, the principal responsibility for produc-
tive recursion in syntax is shouldered by [an] adjoined relative
clause. It is typically marked as subordinate in some way, but its
surface position with respect to the main clause is marginal rather
than embedded” (Hale, 1976: 78); n.b., here Hale is (correctly)
identifying the mathematical inductive aspect of recursion.
Second, any limitations on depth of embedding in structures
that FLN does generate can only be arbitrary—i.e., arbitrary with
respect to the generative function—given that recursiveness—
i.e., computability, definition by induction, and mathematical
induction—is an independent property of the function. For
instance, it would be an (interesting but) arbitrary fact of the
morphology of Kayardild if its oblique case marker “blocks
recursion at one level deep” (Levinson, 2013: 152); embedding—
not to be conflated with recursion—would be “capped at a
very shallow level” (Levinson, 2013: 157). It would be analo-
gously arbitrary if in some arithmetical system it were impos-
sible to represent decimal expansions of length n, n > 2, such
that π could only ever be expanded to 3.14. The mathe-
matical fact would remain that a computable function for π
generates its infinite decimal expansion (n.b., this fact distin-
guishes a computable function from a lookup table listing the
decimal expansion to some finite length); unboundedness is
a property of generative competence, not its application in
performance.
Third, it is false that “boundedness is principled” if for instance
it is possible for the generative function only to “produc[e] a max-
imum phrase consisting of the verb’s lexical frame plus as much
as one modifier word per constituent of the phrase and up to one
prepositional adjunct phrase” (Everett, 2012: 558); incidentally,
the bound is claimed only for “sentential syntax,” but of course
syntax—and recursion—extends “super-sententially” (as we will
discuss). This function is demonstrably computable: i.e., the set of
possible phrases is non-arbitrary and, even if finite, contains too
many members to be listed as a lookup table; thus it must be gen-
erated by a finitary (recursive) procedure. The function is defined
by induction: i.e., outputs are recursed (carried forward on tape)
as inputs to strongly generate structured expressions; thus the
process is not a form of iteration (equivalently tail recursion) as
claimed2. And finally, the function is mathematically inductive:
i.e., unboundedness would emerge with relaxation of the arbi-
trary lexical restrictions; furthermore, even with such restrictions,
it has not been demonstrated that the number of arguments per
verb and the number of modifiable constituents is bounded by
principle. In short, this function is recursive.
Ultimately, any boundedness is demonstrably arbitrary as
proved by the undisputed fact that recursion is unbounded in
some (i.e., most or, as we submit, all) languages: i.e., it fol-
lows from mathematical law that recursion is unlearnable and
thus must be part of the species endowment (UG), and thus
universal3. The number faculty is analogous:
“[Counting] is universal, and whether or not a conventionalized
inventory of numerals exists in a given language depends upon
the extent to which exact enumeration is of practical use or neces-
sity to the people who speak the language. One might look upon
the Walbiri lack of conventionalized numerals as a gap in the
inventory of cultural items—since the principle which underlies
counting is present,” i.e., genetically determined, “filling the gap is
a rather trivial matter. [C]ertain cultural items can be said to be
universal even though they may not be included in the inventory
of cultural items for particular communities. This is not a contra-
diction if one bears in mind that what is universal is the concept,
not some conventionalized manifestation of it” (Hale, 1975: 296).
Therefore even if it were true that “[t]he upper limit of a Pirahã
sentence is a lexical frame with modifiers [a]nd up to two [. . . ]
additional sentence-level or verb-level prepositional adjuncts”
(Everett, 2012: 560), nothing would follow for the universality
of recursion. And incidentally, to reiterate, it is undisputed that
all languages are recursively unbounded at the super-sentential
2A tail recursive procedure applies only to the end (the “tail”) of the immedi-
ately preceding output; the entire “derivational history” is not carried forward
on the Turing tape. The strong generation of Pirahã sentences thus goes
beyond tail recursion. (Note that tail recursion is still recursion, so no claim
remains that recursion is absent from Pirahã.)
3We assume with the majority of researchers that humans do not vary geneti-
cally in their linguistic capacities. But even if there were variation, recursion in
some form or another would need to be encoded genetically because it cannot
be learned even in principle. If the capacity for recursion—computability and
inductive definitions and mathematical induction—were knocked out of the
genome in toto, the phenotypic effects would be catastrophic: language would
crash and the systems it enables would collapse; ultimately, any cognitive
domain with computable and/or inductive properties would fail.
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(discourse) level; and the sentential/super-sentential distinction
is artificial, as we discuss in section Universality.
EVOLUTION
The FLN thesis is a proposal about what is unique to our
species and unique to the faculty of language. As in any claim
about uniqueness, comparative research is required—in this case,
comparing the capacities of different species as well as differ-
ent domains of knowledge other than language within our own
species. To suggest that only humans are endowed with recur-
sive capacities that map to the sensory-motor and conceptual-
intentional systems is to formulate a challenge for comparative
work, a challenge that requires critical observations and experi-
ments. To this end, Fitch and Hauser (2004) sought to develop
a research program that would potentially enable a test of this
hypothesis. Due to its computational rigor and clarity, they
started with the Chomsky hierarchy (Chomsky, 1959a). More
specifically, they designed an experiment based on two features
that would facilitate comparison with humans, both young and
old: (1) an experimental procedure that required no training
and thus could elicit evidence of spontaneous processing, akin
to child language acquisition; (2) stimuli designed to distinguish
between different levels of computational power, specifically, one
pattern mapping onto a finite-state grammar as opposed to one
mapping onto a phrase-structure grammar. This was a test of
computational power, not the three criterial properties of recur-
sion; establishing the former is necessary to exploring the latter.
Based on both the introduction to this paper, and its conclusions,
independently of the particular results, not even the most pos-
itive evidence would serve to knockout the FLN thesis. Rather,
this experiment was designed to provide a different approach to
the problem of comparing across species, one that might enable a
more direct comparison between humans and non-human ani-
mals. Results showed that cotton-top tamarins spontaneously
processed the finite-state grammar (i.e., ABn), but failed to pro-
cess the phrase-structure grammar (i.e., AnBn). Fitch and Hauser
concluded that the generative capacity required to fully process
a phrase-structure may have been the bottleneck that we alone
broke through.
Based on both the design and results of Fitch and Hauser’s
experiment with cotton-top tamarins, other studies on other
species soon emerged (e.g., Gentner et al., 2006; Rey et al.,
2012), using both similarly designed stimuli (i.e., “grammars”),
but typically differently designed methodologies. Unfortunately,
in our opinion, most of these studies misinterpreted the rea-
soning behind the Fitch and Hauser experiments, both in terms
of methodological design as well as theoretical implications.
Specifically, the majority of studies that followed used massive
training, as opposed to spontaneous methods. Though these
methods can show what an animal can do under these con-
ditions (thousands of trials with reinforcement), these are not
the conditions in which human children acquire language. No
child forms a fully functional grammar based on exposure to
50,000 exemplars from an extremely narrow set of inputs, and
then differentially reinforced for correct responses. This was an
idea long ago put forward by Skinner (1957), and soundly taken
apart by Chomsky (1959b). This is not to say, however, that the
spontaneous looking time method is without serious flaws: e.g.,
the method only enables a small difference in conditions that may
be biologically insignificant (i.e., differences of 1–2 s in looking
time between conditions can give a statistically significant result);
because studies of animals use small populations, it is not possi-
ble to test the variety of alternative explanations. Thus, the results
using either method gain little traction in terms of meaningful
comparison with human ontogeny.
In addition to the methodological departures, most of the
studies using the Chomsky hierarchy as in Fitch and Hauser
(2004) have falsely concluded that evidence of successful process-
ing of embedding constitutes evidence against the FLN hypothe-
sis. But as noted above, this conclusion simply does not follow:
recursion and embedding are not synonymous; nor are gener-
ation and processing. Furthermore, all of the published work
on embedding, even in the best cases, shows nothing like the
structured expressions that FLN strongly generates.
So what would studies of non-human animals need to demon-
strate to challenge the FLN hypothesis? Given the definition
of recursion discussed in the previous sections, it would be
necessary to show the spontaneous display of (i) computability,
(ii) definition by induction, and (iii) mathematical induction.
(i) Computability requires proof of a procedure: a conditional
branching program that generates new and complex representa-
tions by combining and manipulating symbols, as in human lan-
guage; this productive process is to be contrasted with the retrieval
of representations from a lookup table (finite and innately spec-
ified or memorized), as in the calls of non-human primates.
(ii) The computable function must be defined by induction:
outputs must be carried forward and returned as inputs. For
instance, animal navigation by path integration (dead reckon-
ing) requires the carrying forward of vector values: displacements
are summed to plot a path. However, to demonstrate equivalence
with linguistic recursion, this process would need its outputs to
be not only returned as inputs but also represented hierarchi-
cally. Summing vectors just generates another vector (in a tail
recursive process), not a hierarchical structure over which can
be defined complex relations (e.g., syntactic, semantic, phono-
logical, etc.); this also implies discreteness of representations. (iii)
Mathematical induction is seen in the jump from finite to infinite.
This can be demonstrated by generalization beyond the expo-
sure material (e.g., counting indefinitely beyond the training set)
and by revealing an unbounded competence underlying bounded
performance (e.g., human performance in processing syntactic
structures increases indefinitely—with no changes to the internal
program of competence—if time and access to external memory
are increased, and so too should that of any non-human animal
endowed with a comparable competence). Thus, the potential for
productive future research is vast, but will rely on the creation of
far more clever methods than presently available.
UNIVERSALITY
If recursion is as fundamental to language as we have argued,
some would say it could be “discounted” as a linguistic univer-
sal, for it would be one of those “features of language that are
universal by definition—that is, we would not call the object in
question a language if it lacked these properties [and others] that
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all languages need in order to be adequately expressive instru-
ments” (Evans and Levinson, 2009: 437). But this argument is
unsound.
First, it is not as if a language precedes its properties, specifying
those it requires to be “adequately expressive,” thereby satisfying
some Lamarckian “felt need.” FLN formed by the emergence and
organization of properties into a system that may or may not be
adequate for any expression.
Second, and most importantly, given the existence of such
systems, the non-trivial task is to discover those properties def-
initional of these systems: i.e., the system must be defined in
intension. As explicated by Carnap(1955: 42), “the intension of a
predicate ‘Q’ [. . . ] is the general condition which an object y must
fulfill in order for [the ascription of] ‘Q’ to y.” What are the con-
ditions an object must satisfy for it to be classed as a “language”?
These conditions (satisfiable by particular properties) are the
desiderata of the language sciences—indeed intensional defini-
tions are the desiderata of science generally (e.g., “What is life?”).
In other words, it would be odd to dismiss from consideration
“features of language that are universal by definition” because the
definition of language is an empirical discovery: the properties of
the definition are thus architectural universals—the profoundest
of all. Recursion, we submit, is an architectural universal.
SUPER-SENTENTIAL SYNTAX
Interestingly, it is universally recognized that recursion is an archi-
tectural universal (from Hauser et al., 2002 to Everett, 2012 and
Levinson, 2013). The only issue is whether the universality of
recursion is exclusively super-sentential (e.g., recursive discourse
structure)4. In our judgment this is a non-issue: there is no
difference in kind between “sentential” and “super-sentential”
recursion. A proper defense of this judgment would exceed the
bounds of this essay, so here we merely adumbrate our argument.
In current generative grammar, the “sentence” exists only
informally as a description of an intuitively perceived “unit” of
syntactic computation. But technically there is posited to exist
only the irreducibly elementary fMERGE function (central to FLN)
and the sets of structured expressions of various sizes it gener-
ates. (Any adequate theory of language must posit some recursive
mechanism. Perhaps it need not be fMERGE, but it must be prop-
ertied with the three forms of recursion that are represented in
fMERGE: computability, definition by induction, and mathemati-
cal induction.) fMERGE is a function “calculable by finite means,”
i.e., a computable function: fMERGE(X, Y) = {X, Y}; given syn-
tactic objects X, Y, fMERGE forms the set {X, Y}. {X, Y} can be
recursed to merge with a syntactic object Z to strongly gen-
erate {Z, {X, Y}}. {Z, {X, Y}} is thus defined recursively (i.e.,
by induction) in a stepwise strongly generative process creating
increasing complexity5. And obviously a quintessential property
of linguistic recursion—as it appears in FLN—is the induction
4For us a discourse structure can be informally described as a “paragraph,” not
a “dialog” as analyzed in Levinson (2013) and criticized in Legate et al. (2013);
that is, we define a discourse to be a combination of “sentences” internal to one
language user rather than an interaction between language users.
5As an exercise, substitute the for X, apple for Y, and eat for Z to generate a verb
phrase; this recursively generated structured expression could be informally
described as “sub-sentential.”
from bounded to unbounded: fMERGE(W, {Z, {X, Y}}) = {W, {Z,
{X, Y}}}; fMERGE(T, {W, {Z, {X, Y}}}) = {T, {W, {Z, {X, Y}}}}; . . . .
This requires the logical architecture of a Turing machine with
its tape to carry forward intermediate outputs to be recursed as
inputs; and fMERGE is naturally modeled as the “write” function
of the machine.
In purely syntactic (formal) structures, e.g., {Z, {X, Y}}, we see
no reason—nor has any been given—for stipulating that “sen-
tences” cannot be substituted for the variables, thereby generating
a “discourse” structure (informally, a “paragraph”). Such a struc-
ture, however it is represented6 must of course be generated (not
fetched from a lookup table). The function generative of this
structure either is fMERGE or it is not fMERGE. Clearly, unless we
have truly compelling evidence that it is not fMERGE, we should
assume on general grounds of parsimony that it is fMERGE. We
are unaware of any evidence that the function in question is
not fMERGE, so we should assume that it is fMERGE. We there-
fore assume that discourse structures are recursively generated,
but much remains to be fleshed out [see Watumull and Roberts
(under review) for a fuller treatment of super-sentential syntax].
CONCLUSION
Support for rejection of the FLN thesis speaks directly to our
conception of human nature (i.e., those traits unique to and
definitional of the species) and the nature of the universe (i.e.,
the ontological interconnection of mathematics and biology).
Understanding this thesis is thus of fundamental importance.
And such an understanding is possible only if one of its core
concepts—recursion—is precisified formally into its three crite-
rial properties as discovered and expounded by Turing and Gödel:
the computability of rules generative of non-arbitrary sets; defini-
tion by induction enabling the strong generation of increasingly
structured expressions; and mathematical induction for the prin-
cipled (and potentially unbounded) expansion of the generated
sets of structures. So understood, recursion is the foundational
linguistic universal.
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